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BOOK REVIEW
WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING. By Clifford S.
Fishman.* Rochester: Lawyers Co-Operative Publishing
Co. 1978. Pp. 587 and Supplement
Reviewed by Herman Kaufman**
Eavesdropping' is a practice as old as society itself.2 Historically, physi-
cal barriers limited the efficacy of most eavesdropping efforts.' Develop-
ments in electronic technology, however, have now eliminated most of
those impediments, making third-party interception of communications
relatively simple.' The use of various eavesdropping techniques by law
enforcement officials to gather information and evidence has long been the
focus of much controversy, both as to its social and constitutional implica-
tions.-
Following a legal debate lasting over forty years, the Supreme Court in
Katz v. United States6 partially resolved the constitutional question, hold-
* Associate Professor, The Catholic University of America School of Law.
A.B., University of Rochester, 1966; J.D., Columbia University, 1969. Professor
Fishman was formerly Executive Assistant District Attorney, Special Narcotics
Prosecutor's Office, New York City.
** Partner, Litman, Friedman, Kaufman & Asche, New York City. B.A., University of
Pennsylvania, 1964; J.D., University of Michigan, 1967.
I. Professor Fishman uses the term eavesdropping to encompass all forms of artificial
surveillance of communications. Two basic forms are identified: wiretapping and bugging,
the latter term including all nonconsensual surveillance of oral communications other than
wiretapping. C. FISHMAN, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING 4-5 (1978).
2. At common law, eavesdropping was condemned as a nuisance. See Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41, 45 (1967).
3. See generally S. DASH, D.R. SCHWARTZ & R.E. KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS
(1971).
4. See generally A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); Van Dewerker, State of
the Art of Electronic Surveillance, in NATIONAL WIRETAP COMMISSION STUDIES 141-215
(1976).
5. See, e.g., H. SCHWARTZ, TAPS, BUGS, AND FOOLING THE PEOPLE (1977); Fishman,
The Interception of Communications Without a Court Order: Title 111, Consent, and the Ex-
pectation of Privacy, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 41 (1977); Westin, Science, Privacy and Freedom.-
Issues and Proposalsfor the 1970's, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1003 (1966).
6. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the Supreme Court squarely rejected the "trespass
doctrine" articulated in Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438 (1928), and Goldman v.
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ing that eavesdropping constituted a "search and seizure" under the fourth
amendment and was thus subject to the warrant requirement. The Court
did, however, sanction eavesdropping under circumstances in which the
government first secured a warrant. Such court-ordered surveillance is the
subject of a new text, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping by Clifford S. Fish-
man. Professor Fishman is well-qualified to write on this subject. As a
prosecutor under the late Frank S. Hogan, the District Attorney of Man-
hattan, New York City, the author drafted and litigated the validity of
more than forty eavesdrops.
The principle focus of the text is Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 7 which is the primary statute regulating
eavesdropping. 8 But before examining the legal ramifications of eaves-
dropping, Professor Fishman first explores an extremely difficult problem:
when should the prosecutor exercise his discretion to seek an eavesdrop-
ping order?9 It is commendable that the author raises this perplexing
question without purporting to answer it fully. Too often, prosecutors
plunge into the area of electronic surveillance without seriously consider-
ing whether the surveillance will be productive, whether needed evidence
can be obtained from other sources, and most importantly, whether the
surveillance is worth its potentially enormous costs.'0
Title III prescribes a rigid warrant procedure. Although some areas of
the law can adequately be learned through experience, as the author cor-
rectly points out, the law of eavesdropping cannot. Wiretapping and Eaves-
dropping, therefore, will serve as a valuable resource tool. In separate
chapters, Professor Fishman fully explores the ingredients of a properly
drafted eavesdropping application, establishment of a listening post,' 2
the eavesdropping warrant' 3 and its execution,' 4 and the litigation of a
United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), as the touchstone for determining whether a "search and
seizure" had occurred within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
7. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2525 (1976).
8. States were authorized to enact similar legislation which could not be more permis-
sive than Title III. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (1976). For a collection of state statutes regulating
eavesdropping, see FISHMAN, supra note 1, at 6 n.14.
9. FISHMAN, supra note 1, at 51-59.
10. These costs include the staffing needed to execute the eavesdrop, the other types of
surveillance that might be required, and the possibility of time-consuming hearings at which
prosecutors may be required to show the absence of taint; that is, that unlawfully obtained
evidence did not contribute to the target's conviction.
11. FISHMAN, supra note 1, at 61-146.
12. Id at 177-92.
13. Id at 147-76.
14. Id at 193-270.
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motion to suppress eavesdropping evidence.' 5 Additionally, the text ex-
amines basic problems of probable cause, the requirement that the warrant
particularize both the persons and communications to be overheard, stand-
ing to contest eavesdropping violations, and taint.
Professor Fishman has included a separate chapter on the use of eaves-
dropping evidence in connection with the grand jury. 6 Emphasis is
placed on the grand jury's use of such evidence to investigate a crime and
the questioning of potentially hostile witnesses. Two chapters, although
somewhat repetitive, are devoted to the special problems associated with
the introduction of tapes and transcripts at trial.' 7 The author also in-
cludes some investigatory tips for prosecutors' 8 and motion and trial strat-
egies for litigators.19 The latter, however, is too simplified to be a useful
resource for the experienced practitioner.
Professor Fishman asserts that he has provided a critique on the subject
of electronic surveillance. But, except for the material on minimization,2"
the text is primarily expository. Nevertheless, if the practitioner wants to
know when information received from an informer will establish probable
cause or when the accused can obtain a hearing on minimization, the text
will provide the answer. Moreover, the author's expertise in the area is
revealed by his suggestion, for example, on how to use seemingly unfavor-
able information - the acquittal of the target on an unrelated indictment
- in establishing probable cause sufficient to procure an eavesdropping
warrant. Numerous helpful suggestions like this appear throughout the
book, and sample forms have been provided illustrating how to comply
with Title III's warrant procedure.
Unfortunately, Professor Fishman does not discuss the development of
the law of wiretapping and eavesdropping. An historical perspective is
central to an understanding of Title III's purposes because the law was
enacted shortly after the Supreme Court's decisions in Katz v. United
States2 and Berger v. New York.22 In essence, Title III was an attempt by
15. This aspect of eavesdropping is treated in two separate chapters: the legal grounds
for suppression, id at 367-84, and the actual litigation of the suppression motion. Id at 385-
438.
16. Id at 317-44.
17. Id at 439-85, 487-516.
18. See, e.g., id. at 116-28, 198-99.
19. See, e.g., id at 260-63, 345-46, 488-96.
20. See id at 203-18, 226-32. See also Fishman, The "'Minimization" Requirement in
Electronic Surveillance- Title III, The Fourth Amendment, and the Dread Scott Decision, 28
AM. U.L. REV. 315 (1979).
21. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
22. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
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Congress to comply with the constitutional considerations identified by the
Court in those cases.2 3 Katz is particularly important because the Court
placed all communications for which there is an actual and reasonable
expectation of privacy under the protection of the fourth amendment.24 In
the forty years between Katz and Olmstead v. United States,25 there was no
legal requirement to obtain a warrant for surveillance unless it was carried
out by means of a trespass into the target's quarters. 26 If the eavesdrop-
ping equipment was sophisticated enough to allow conversations to be
overheard without committing a trespass, the courts were completely de-
prived of control over the nature and extent of the surveillance, a consider-
ation which spurred a movement to abolish electronic surveillance
altogether. Although placing eavesdropping under certain constitutional
constraints, Katz nevertheless acknowledged that eavesdropping can be
accommodated under the fourth amendment and thus returned its control
to the courts.
Also missing from Professor Fishman's work is an examination of the
protection afforded to the privacy of communications by Katz and whether
such protection differs from that afforded by Title III. Commentators have
generally neglected this important area and its constitutional ramifications.
The most comprehensive sections of Wiretapping and Eavesdropping
concern minimization. Under Title III, law enforcement officers executing
an eavesdrop warrant are required to "minimize the interception of com-
munications not otherwise subject to interception. "27 Concluding that this
provision was included to safeguard the privacy rights of innocent persons
and to comply with the constitutional prerequisites specified in Berger v.
New York,28 Professor Fishman identifies and analyzes four varieties of
minimization: extrinsic; intrinsic; dual recorder; and after-the-fact. 29 Pro-
23. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2112.
24. 389 U.S. at 350-53. Although the Supreme Court in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41 (1967), carved out important protections to be incorporated into the warrant procedure
whenever surveillance constituted a search and seizure, it was not until Katz that the Court
squarely decided that the applicability of the fourth amendment depends upon the nature of
the conversations overheard, rather than the manner of eavesdropping.
25. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Olmstead involved wiretapping which, although not accom-
plished by a trespass, was a federal crime whose fruits were always inadmissible in federal
trials. See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 279 (1937). In 1968, the Supreme Court
overruled Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952), and held that such wiretapping evidence
was inadmissible in state trials as well. Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968).
26. See, e.g., Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964); Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505 (1961); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976).
28. 388 U.S. at 54-60.
29. FISHMAN, supra note 1, at 203-06.
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fessor Fishman has devised a comprehensive set of instructions for use by
monitoring officers 30 to secure compliance with the minimization require-
ment. These sample instructions are a model for all prosecutors to follow
and are themselves highly informative.
In the first years after Title III's enactment, many lawyers feared that,
without a tough minimization requirement, facially valid eavesdropping
orders would be converted into general warrants during the execution
process. Controlling the officer's execution of an eavesdrop by requiring
him to follow minimization instructions was thought to be the best means
of establishing that there was a good faith effort to minimize. A number of
courts held proof of good faith to be essential for demonstrating compli-
ance with the minimization requirement.3 '
But subjective good faith is no longer legally relevant. In Scott v. United
States,32 the Supreme Court held that, in deciding whether there was com-
pliance with the minimization requirement, courts must judge the officer's
conduct by an objective standard, taking into account all the facts and
circumstances of the particular case. The author's despair in analyzing this
development prevents him from observing the obvious: by rejecting the
requirement that officers document the existence of their good faith in at-
tempting to minimize, the Supreme Court may have abandoned the best
evidence available concerning whether there was in fact minimization.
Only by requiring good faith can courts ever be assured that there was any
minimization at all. Thus, the Supreme Court's abandonment of the good
faith requirement in favor of an objective test may have been a self-defeat-
ing gesture.
There is virtually no treatment of the crucial question of whether prose-
cutors must show that the surveillance will achieve a proper, ascertainable
objective in order to limit the extent of the eavesdropping conducted.3 3
Title III is silent on this point, simply providing that the eavesdropping
order must terminate when the authorized prosecutor's objective is ob-
tained.34 There is no statutory requirement that the applicant define the
objective of the eavesdropping or communicate it to the court. If prosecu-
tors are not required to state a reasonably ascertainable objective, eaves-
dropping can last interminably - until the prosecutor, in effect, gets what
he wants. This may render the eavesdropping process vulnerable to a con-
30. Id at 232-40.
31. See authorities cited in id at 230-31 n.1.
32. 436 U.S. 128, 135-37 (1978).
33. The author does, however, advocate delineating the goals of the eavesdrop in the
application to the court. FISHMAN, supra note 1, at 116-18.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976).
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stitutional attack since it resembles a general warrant.35
Even if the applicant can be required to set forth the ultimate objective
of the surveillance, what then constitutes a valid objective: simply ob-
taining evidence of a crime; the indictment of the target; or the location of
other potential targets? Moreover, may an authorized objective merely be
the subject of the prosecutor's fantasies, or must the objective be reason-
ably ascertainable based on the existing facts? The courts and commenta-
tors have not yet explored these questions, and they are clearly ripe for
analysis.
35. See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 54-60 (1967).
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